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Abstract
Designing an incentive compatible auction that maximizes expected revenue is a central
problem in Auction Design. While theoretical approaches to the problem have hit some limits, a
recent research direction initiated by Duetting et al. (2019) consists in building neural network
architectures to find optimal auctions. We propose two conceptual deviations from their approach
which result in enhanced performance. First, we use recent results in theoretical auction
design (Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018) to introduce a time-independent Lagrangian. This not
only circumvents the need for an expensive hyper-parameter search (as in prior work), but also
provides a principled metric to compare the performance of two auctions (absent from prior
work). Second,the optimization procedure in previous work uses an inner maximization loop to
compute optimal misreports. We amortize this process through the introduction of an additional
neural network. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by learning competitive or
strictly improved auctions compared to prior work. Both results together further imply a novel
formulation of Auction Design as a two-player game with stationary utility functions.
1 Introduction
Efficiently designing truthful auctions is a core problem in Mathematical Economics. Concrete
examples include the sponsored search auctions conducted by companies as Google or auctions run
on platforms as eBay. Following seminal work of Vickrey (Vickrey, 1961) and Myerson (Myerson,
1981), auctions are typically studied in the independent private valuations model: each bidder has a
valuation function over items, and their payoff depends only on the items they receive. Moreover, the
auctioneer knows aggregate information about the population that each bidder comes from, modeled
as a distribution over valuation functions, but does not know precisely each bidder’s valuation (outside
of any information provided by this Bayesian prior). A major difficulty in designing auctions is that
valuations are private and bidders need to be incentivized to report their valuations truthfully. The
goal of the auctioneer is to design an incentive compatible auction which maximizes expected revenue.
Auction Design has existed as a rigorous mathematical field for several decades and yet, complete
characterizations of the optimal auction only exist for a few settings. While Myerson’s Nobel prize-
winning work provides a clean characterization of the single-item optimum (Myerson, 1981), optimal
multi-item auctions provably suffer from numerous formal measures of intractability (including
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computational intractability, high description complexity, non-monotonicity, and others) (Daskalakis
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2014, 2015, 2018; Hart and Reny, 2015; Thanassoulis, 2004).
An orthogonal line of work instead develops deep learning architectures to find the optimal
auction. Duetting et al. (2019) initiated this direction by proposing RegretNet, a feed-forward
architecture. They frame the auction design problem as a constrained learning problem and lift the
constraints into the objective via the augmented Lagrangian method. Training RegretNet involves
optimizing this Lagrangian-penalized objective, while simultaneously updating network parameters
and the Lagrangian multipliers themselves. This architecture produces impressive results: recovering
near-optimal auctions in several known multi-item settings, and discovering new mechanisms when a
theoretical optimum is unknown.
Yet, this approach presents several limitations. On the conceptual front, this approach does
not leverage state-of-the-art work in Auction Theory for the multi-bidder setting. Our work, on
the other hand, leverages an exciting line of recent works (Hartline and Lucier, 2010; Hartline
et al., 2011; Bei and Huang, 2011; Daskalakis and Weinberg, 2012; Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2018;
Dughmi et al., 2017; Cai et al., 2019) on ε-truthful-to-truthful reductions.1 On the technical front,
we identify three areas for improvement. First, their architecture is difficult to train in practice as
the objective is non-stationary. Specifically, the Lagrangian multipliers are time-dependent and they
increase following a pre-defined schedule, which requires careful hyperparameter tuning (see §4.1 for
experiments illustrating this). Leveraging the aforementioned works in Auction Theory, we propose
a stationary Lagrangian objective. Second, all prior work inevitably finds auctions which are not
precisely incentive compatible, and does not provide a metric to compare, say, an auction with
revenue 1.01 which is 0.002-truthful, or one with revenue 1 which is 0.001-truthful. We argue that
our stationary Lagrangian objective serves as the desired metric (and that the second auction of
our short example is “better”). Finally, their training procedure requires an inner-loop optimization
(essentially, this inner loop is the bidders trying to maximize utility in the current auction), which is
itself computationally expensive. We use amortized optimization to make this process more efficient.
Contributions
This paper leverages recent work in Auction Theory to formulate a two-player game to learn
revenue-optimal auctions, and develops a new algorithm ALGnet (Auction Learning Game network).
We produce competitive or better results compared to Duetting et al. (2019). In addition to the
conceptual contributions, our approach yields the following improvements:
– Easier hyper-parameter tuning : By constructing a time-independent loss function, we circum-
vent the need to search for an adequate parameter scheduling. Our formulation also involves
less hyperparameters, which makes it more robust.
– A metric to compare auctions: We propose a principled metric to compare the quality of
auctions which are not precisely incentive compatible, based on recent work of Rubinstein and
Weinberg (2018).
– More efficient training : We replace the inner-loop optimization of prior work with a neural
network, which makes training more efficient.
1By ε-truthful, we mean the expected total regret R is bounded by ε. See Prop. 1 for a definition of R.
2
– Online auctions: Since the learning formulation is time-invariant, ALGnet is able to quickly
adapt in auctions where the bidders’ valuation distributions varies over time. Such setting
appears for instance in the online posted pricing problem studied in Bubeck et al. (2017).
Furthermore, these technical contributions together now imply a novel formulation of auction learning
as a two-player game between an auctioneer and a misreporter. The auctioneer is trying to design
an incentive compatible auction that maximizes revenue while the misreporter is trying to identify
breaches in the truthfulness of these auctions.
The paper decomposes as follows. §3 introduces the standard notions of auction design. §4
presents our game formulation for auction learning. §5 provides a description of ALGnet and its
training procedure. Finally, §6 presents numerical evidence for the effectiveness of our approach.
2 Related work
Auction design and machine learning. Machine learning and computational learning theory
have been used in several ways to design auctions from samples of bidder valuations. Machine
learning has been used to analyze the sample complexity of designing optimal revenue-maximizing
auctions. This includes the framework of single-parameter settings (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015;
Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Morgenstern and Roughgarden, 2015; Medina and Mohri, 2014;
Huang et al., 2018; Devanur et al., 2016; Hartline and Taggart, 2019; Roughgarden and Schrijvers,
2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Guo et al., 2019), multi-item auctions (Dughmi et al., 2014;
Gonczarowski and Weinberg, 2018), combinatorial auctions (Balcan et al., 2016; Morgenstern and
Roughgarden, 2016; Syrgkanis, 2017) and allocation mechanisms (Narasimhan and Parkes, 2016).
Other works have leveraged machine learning to optimize different aspects of mechanisms (Lahaie,
2011; Dütting et al., 2015). Our approach is different as we build a deep learning architecture for
auction design.
Auction design and deep learning. While Duetting et al. (2019) is the first paper to design
auctions through deep learning, several other paper followed-up this work. Feng et al. (2018) extended
it to budget constrained bidders, Golowich et al. (2018) to the facility location problem. Tacchetti
et al. (2019) built architectures based on the Vickrey- Clarke-Groves mechanism. Rahme et al.
(2020) used permutation-equivariant networks to design symmetric auctions. Shen et al. (2019) and
Duetting et al. (2019) proposed architectures that exactly satisfy incentive compatibility but are
specific to single-bidder settings. While all the previously mentioned papers consider a non-stationary
objective function, we formulate a time-invariant objective that is easier to train and that makes
comparisons between mechanisms possible.
3 Auction design as a time-varying learning problem
We first review the framework of auction design and the problem of finding truthful mechanisms.
We then remind the learning problem proposed by Duetting et al. (2019) to find auctions and its
training procedure.
3.1 Auction design and linear program
Auction design. We consider an auction with n bidders and m items. We will denote by
N = {1, . . . , n} and M = {1, . . . ,m} the set of bidders and items. Each bidder i values item j at a
valuation denoted vij . We will focus on additive auctions. These are auctions where the value of a
set S of items is equal to the sum of the values of the elements in that set at
∑
j∈S vij . Additive
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auctions are perhaps the most well-studied setting in multi-item auction design (Hart and Nisan,
2012; Hart et al., 2013; Li and Yao, 2013; Babaioff et al., 2014; Daskalakis et al., 2014; Hart and
Reny, 2015; Cai et al., 2016; Daskalakis et al., 2017; Beyhaghi and Weinberg, 2019).
The auctioneer does not know the exact valuation profile V = (vij)i∈N,j∈M of the bidders in
advance but he does know the distribution from which they are drawn: the valuation vector of
bidder i, ~vi = (vi1, . . . , vim) is drawn from a distribution Di over Rm. We will further assume that all
bidders are independent and that D1 = · · · = Dn. As a result V is drawn from D := ⊗ni=1Di = D⊗
n
1 .
Definition 1. An auction is defined by a randomized allocation rule g = (g1, . . . , gn) and a payment
rule p = (p1, . . . , pn) where gi : Rn×m → [0, 1]m and pi : Rn×m → R>0. Additionally for all items j
and valuation profiles V , the gi must satisfy
∑
i[gi(V )]j 6 1.
Given a bid matrix B = (bij)i∈N,j∈M , [gi(B)]j is the probability that bidder i receives object j
and pi(B) is the price bidder i has to pay to the auction. The condition
∑
i[gi(V )]j 6 1 allows the
possibility for an item to be not allocated.
Definition 2. The utility of bidder i is defined by ui(~vi, B) =
∑m
j=1[gi(B)]jvij − pi(B).
Bidders seek to maximize their utility and may report bids that are different from their true
valuations. In the following, we will denote by B−i the (n − 1) ×m bid matrix without bidder i,
and by (~b′i, B−i) the n×m bid matrix that inserts ~b′i into row i of B−i (for example: B := (~bi, B−i).
We aim at auctions that incentivize bidders to bid their true valuations.
Definition 3. An auction (g, p) is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if each bidder’s
utility is maximized by reporting truthfully no matter what the other bidders report. For every bidder
i, valuation ~vi ∈ Di, bid ~bi ′ ∈ Di and bids B−i ∈ D−i, ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > ui(~vi, (~bi ′, B−i)).
Definition 4. An auction is individually rational (IR) if for all i ∈ N, ~vi ∈ Di and B−i ∈ D−i,
ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > 0. (IR)
In a DSIC auction, the bidders have the incentive to truthfully report their valuations and
therefore, the revenue on valuation profile V is
∑n
i=1 pi(V ). Optimal auction design aims at finding
a DSIC and IR auction that maximizes the expected revenue rev := EV∼D[
∑n
i=1 pi(V )]. Since there
is no known characterization of DSIC mechanisms in the multi-item setting, we resort to the relaxed
notion of ex-post regret. It measures the extent to which an auction violates DSIC.
Definition 5. The ex-post regret for a bidder i is the maximum increase in his utility when considering
all his possible bids and fixing the bids of others. For a valuation profile V , it is given by ri(V ) =
max~bi ′∈Rm ui(~vi, (
~bi
′, V−i))− ui(~vi, (~vi, V−i)). In particular, DSIC is equivalent to
ri(V ) = 0, ∀i ∈ N, ∀V ∈ D. (IC)
The bid ~b′i that achieves ri(V ) is called the optimal misreport of bidder i for valuation profile V .
Therefore, finding an optimal auction is equivalent to the following linear program:
min
(g,p)∈M
− EV∼D
[
n∑
i=1
pi(V )
]
s.t. ri(V ) = 0, ∀ i ∈ N, ∀ V ∈ D,
ui(~vi, (~vi, B−i)) > 0, ∀i ∈ N, ~vi ∈ Di, B−i ∈ D−i.
(LP)
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3.2 Auction design as a learning problem
As the space of auctions M may be large, we will set a parametric model. In what follows, we
consider the class of auctions (gw, pw) encoded by a neural network of parameter w ∈ Rd. The
corresponding utility and regret function will be denoted by uwi and r
w
i .
Following Duetting et al. (2019), the formulation (LP) is relaxed: the IC constraint for all
V ∈ D is replaced by the expected constraint EV∼D[rwi (V )] = 0 for all i ∈ N. The justification for
this relaxation can be found in Duetting et al. (2019). By replacing expectations with empirical
averages, the learning problem becomes:
min
w∈Rd
− 1
L
L∑
`=1
n∑
i=1
pwi (V
(`)) s.t. r̂wi :=
1
L
L∑
`=1
rwi (V
(`)) = 0, ∀i ∈ N. (L̂P)
The learning problem (L̂P) does not ensure (IR). However, this constraint is usually built into
the parametrization (architecture) of the model: by design, the only auction mechanism considered
satisfy (IR). More details on how this restriction is implemented can be found in Duetting et al.
(2019); Rahme et al. (2020) or in Section 5.
4 Auction learning as a two-player game
We first present the optimization and the training procedures for (L̂P) proposed by Duetting et al.
(2019). We then demonstrate with numerical evidence that this approach presents two limitations:
hyperparameter sensitivity and lack of interpretability. Building upon the work by Rubinstein and
Weinberg (2018), we construct a new loss function that circumvents these two aspects. Lastly, we
resort to amortized optimization and reframe the auction learning problem as a two-player game.
4.1 The augmented Lagrangian method and its shortcomings
Optimization and training. We briefly review the training procedure proposed by Duetting
et al. (2019) to learn optimal auctions. The authors apply the augmented Lagrangian method to
solve the constrained problem (L̂P) and consider the loss:
L(w;λ; ρ) = − 1
L
L∑
`=1
∑
i∈N
pwi (V
(`)) +
∑
i∈N
λir
w
i (V
(`)) +
ρ
2
(∑
i∈N
rwi (V
(`))
)2
,
where λ ∈ Rn is a vector of Lagrange multipliers and ρ > 0 is a parameter controlling the weight of
the quadratic penalty. We refer the reader to App. A for more details about the training procedure.
Scheduling consistency problem. The parameters λ and ρ are time-varying. Indeed, their
value changes according to a pre-defined scheduling of the following form: 1) Initialize λ and ρ with
respectively λ0 and ρ0, 2) Update ρ every Tρ iterations : ρt+1 ← ρt + c, where c is a pre-defined
constant, 3) Update λ every Tλ iterations according to λt+1i ← λti + ρt r̂w
t
i .
Therefore, this scheduling requires to set up five hyper parameters (λ0, ρ0, c, Tλ, Tρ). Some of
the experiments (Duetting et al., 2019) were about learning an optimal mechanism for an n-bidder
m-item auction (n×m) where the valuations are iid U [0, 1]. Different scheduling parameters were
used for different values of n and m. We report the values of the hyper parameters used for the 1× 2,
3× 10 and 5× 10 settings in Table 1(a). A natural question is whether the choice of parameters
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heavily affects the performance. We proceed to a numerical investigation of this questions but trying
different schedulings (columns) for different settings (rows) and report our the results in Table 1(b).
1× 2 3× 10 5× 10
λ0 5 5 1
ρ0 1 1 0.25
c 50 1 0.25
Tλ 10
2 102 102
Tρ 10
4 104 105
(a)
Schedule
1× 2 3× 10 5× 10
Setting rev rgt rev rgt rev rgt
1× 2 0.552 0.0001 0.573 0.0012 0.332 0.0179
3× 10 4.825 0.0007 5.527 0.0017 5.880 0.0047
5× 10 4.768 0.0006 5.424 0.0033 6.749 0.0047
(b)
Table 1: (a): Scheduling parameters values set in Duetting et al. (2019) to reach optimal auctions in
n×m settings with n bidders, m objects and i.i.d. valuations sampled from U [0, 1]. (b): Revenue
rev := EV∼D[
∑n
i=1 pi(V )] and average regret per bidder reg := 1/nEV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 ri(V )] for n × m
settings when using the different parameters values set reported in (a).
We see that the auction returned by the network dramatically varies with the choice of scheduling
parameters. For instance, when applying the parameters of 1 × 2 to 5 × 10, we obtain a revenue
that is lower by 30% ! The performance of the learning algorithm strongly depends on the specific
values of the hyperparameters. Finding an adequate scheduling requires an extensive hyperparameter
search which may be lengthy in practice.
Lack of interpretability. How should one compare two mechanisms with different expected
revenue and regret? Is a mechanism M1 with revenue P1 = 1.01 and an average total regret
R1 = 0.02 better than a mechanism M2 with P2 = 1.0 and R2 = 0.01 ? The approach in Duetting
et al. (2019) cannot answer this question. To see that, notice that when λ1 = · · · = λn = λ we can
rewrite L(w;λ; ρ) = −P + λR+ ρ2R2. Which mechanism is better depends on the values of λ and ρ.
For example if ρ = 1 and λ = 0.1 we find that M1 is better, but if ρ = 1 and λ = 10 then M2 is
better. Since the values of λ and ρ change with time, the Lagrangian approach in Duetting et al.
(2019) cannot provide metric to compare two mechanisms.
4.2 A time-independent and interpretable loss function for auction learning
Our first contribution consists in introducing a new loss function for auction learning that addresses
the two first limitations of Duetting et al. (2019) mentioned in §4.1. This loss relies on Prop. 1 which
is a corollary of a result by Rubinstein and Weinberg (2018) (Lemma 2 in App. C).
Proposition 1. Let M be an additive auction with n bidders and m items. Let P and R denote
the total expected revenue and regret, P = EV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 pi(V )] and R = EV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 ri(V )]. There
exists a mechanismM∗ with expected revenue P ∗ =
(√
P −√R
)2
and zero regret R∗ = 0.
A proof of this proposition can be found in App. C. Comparing two mechanisms is straightforward
when both of them have zero-regret: the better one is the one with the highest revenue. Prop. 1
allows a natural and simple extension of this criteria for non zero-regret mechanism: M1 is better
than M2 if and only if M∗1 is better than M∗2 :
M1 >M2 ⇐⇒ P ∗(M1) > P ∗(M2) ⇐⇒
√
P1 −
√
R1 >
√
P2 −
√
R2
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With this metric, a mechanism with revenue of 1.00 and regret of 0.01 is better than one with
revenue 1.01 and regret 0.02 .
This way of comparing mechanisms motivates the use of loss function: L(P,R) = −(√P −√R)
instead of the Lagrangian from Section §4. In practice however, we will use the modified loss function
Lm(P,R) = −(
√
P −√R) +R which reflects our preference for mechanisms with low regret. This
loss function is time-independent, interpretable and hyperparameter-free.
4.3 Amortized misreport optimization
To compute the regret rwi (V ) one has to solve the optimization problem: max~vi ′∈Rm u
w
i (~vi, (~vi
′, V−i))−
uwi (~vi, (~vi, V−i)). In Duetting et al. (2019), this optimization problem is solved with an inner
optimization loop for each valuation profile. In other words, computing the regret of each valuation
profile is solved separately and independently, from scratch.
If two valuation profiles are very close to each other, one should expect that the resulting
optimization problems to have close results. We leverage this to improve training efficiency.
We propose to amortize this inner loop optimization. Instead of solving all these optimization
problems independently, we will instead learn one neural network Mϕ that tries to predict the
solution of all of them. Mϕ takes as entry a valuation profile and maps it to the optimal misreport:
Mϕ :
{
Rn×m → Rn×m
V = [~vi]i∈N → [argmax~v′∈Dui(~vi, (~v′, V−i))]i∈N
The loss Lr that Mϕ is trying to minimize follows naturally from that definition and is then given
by: Lr(ϕ,w) = −EV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 u
w
i (~vi, ([M
ϕ(V )]i, V−i))] .
4.4 Auction learning as a two-player game
In this section, we combine the ideas from §4.2 and §4.3 to obtain a new formulation for the auction
learning problem as a two-player game between an Auctioneer with parameter w and a Misreporter
with parameter ϕ. The optimal parameters for the auction learning problem (w∗, ϕ∗) are a Nash
Equilibrium for this game.
The Auctioneer is trying to design a truthful (IC) and rational (IR) auction that maximizes
revenue. The Misreporter is trying to maximize the bidders’ utility, for the current auction selected
by Auctioneer, w. This is achieved by minimizing the loss function Lr(ϕ,w) wrt to ϕ (as discussed
in §4.3). The Auctioneer in turn maximizes expected revenue, for the current misreports as chosen
by Misreporter. This is achieved by minimizing Lm(w,ϕ) = −(
√
Pw +
√
Rw,ϕ) +Rw,ϕ with respect
to w (as discussed in §4.2). Here Rw,ϕ is an estimate of the total regret that auctioneer computes for
the current Misreporter ϕ, Rw,ϕ = 1L
∑L
`=1
∑
i∈N (u
w
i (~vi, ([M
ϕ(V )]i, V−i))− uwi (~vi, (~vi, V−i))) . This
game formulation can be summarized as follows:

Misreporter:
{
loss: Lr(ϕ,w)
parameter: ϕ
Auctioneer:
{
loss: Lm(w,ϕ)
parameter: w
(G)
Figure 1
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Remark 1. The game formulation (G) reminds us of Generative Adversarial Networks (Goodfellow
et al., 2014). Contrary to GANs, it is not a zero-sum game.
5 Architecture and training procedure
We describe ALGnet, a feed-forward architecture solving for the game formulation (G) and then
provide a training procedure. ALGnet consists in two modules that are the auctioneer’s module and
the misreporter’s module. These components take as input a bid matrix B = (bi,j) ∈ Rn×m and are
trained jointly. Their outputs are used to compute the regret and revenue of the auction.
Notation. We use MLP(din, nl, h, dout) to refer to a fully-connected neural network with input
dimension din, output dimension dout and nl hidden layers of width h and tanh activation function.
sig denotes the sigmoid activation function. Given a matrix B = [~b1, . . . ,~bn]> ∈ Rn×m, we define for
a fixed i ∈ N , the matrix B(i) := [~bi,~b1, . . . ,~bi−1,~bi+1, . . . ,~bn].
5.1 The Auctioneer’s module
It is composed of an allocation network that encodes a randomized allocation gw : Rnm → [0, 1]nm
and a payment network that encodes a payment rule pw : Rnm → Rn.
Allocation network. It computes the allocation probabily of item j to bidder i [gw(B)]ij as
[gw(B)]ij = [f1(B)]j · [f2(B)]ij where f1 : Rn×m → [0, 1]m and f2 : Rn×m → [0, 1]m×n are functions
computed by two feed-forward neural networks.
– [f1(B)]j is the probability that object j ∈M is allocated and is given by:
[f1(B)]j = sig (MLP(nm, na, ha, n)).
– [f2(B)]ij is the probability that item j ∈M is allocated to bidder i ∈ N conditioned on object
j being allocated. A first MLP computes lj := MLP(nm, na, ha,m)(B(j)) for all j ∈M . The
network then concatenates all these vectors lj into a matrix L ∈ Rn×m. A softmax activation
function is finally applied to L to ensure feasibility i.e. for all j ∈M,∑i∈N Lij = 1.
Payment network. It computes the payment [pw(B)]i for bidder i as [pw(B)]i = p˜i
∑m
j=1Bij [g
w(B)]ij ,
where p˜ : Rn×m → [0, 1]n. p˜i is the fraction of bidder’s i utility that she has to pay to the mech-
anism. We compute p˜i = sig (MLP(nm, np, hp, 1)) (B(i)). Finally, notice that by construction
[pw(B)]i 6
∑m
j=1Bijg
w(B)ij which ensures that (IR) is respected.
5.2 The Misreporter’s module
The module consists in an MLP(nm, nM , hM ,m) followed by a projection layer Proj that en-
sure that the output of the network is in the domain D of the valuation. For example when
the valuations are restricted to [0, 1], we can take Proj = sig, if they are non negative num-
ber,we can take Proj = SoftPlus..The optimal misreport for bidder i is then given by Proj ◦
MLP(nm, nM , hM ,m)(B(i)) ∈ Rm. And by stacking all these vectors we get the misreport ma-
trix Mϕ(B).
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5.3 Training procedure and optimization
We optimize the game (G) over the space of neural networks parameters (w,ϕ). The algorithm is
easy to implement (Alg. 1). At each time t, we sample a batch of valuation profiles B. The algorithm
performs τ updates for the Misreporter’s network (line 9) and one update on the Auctioneer’s
network (line 10). Moreover, we often reinitialize the Misreporter’s network every Tinit steps in the
early phases of the training (t 6 Tlimit). This step is not necessary but we found empirically that it
speeds up training.
Algorithm 1 ALGnet training
1: Input: number of agents n, number of objects m.
2: Parameter: stepsize γ > 0, batch size B, number of iterations: T , Tinit, Tlimit, τ ∈ N.
3: Initialize Misreporter’s and Auctioneer’s nets.
4: for t = 1, . . . , T do
5: if t ≡ 0 mod Tinit and t < TLimit then:
6: Reinitialize Misreport Network
7: Sample valuation batch S of size B.
8: for s = 1, . . . , τ do
9: Update the Misreporter’s parameters: ϕs+1 ← ϕs − γ∇ϕLr(ϕs, wt)(S).
10: Update the Auctioneer’s parameters: wt+1 ← wt − γ∇wLm(wt, ϕ)(S).
6 Experimental Results
We show that our approach can recover near-optimal auctions in settings for which the optimal
solution is known and that it can find new auctions for settings where there is no known analytical
solution. The results obtained are competitive or better than the ones obtained in Duetting et al.
(2019) while requiring much less hyperparameters. We also evaluate ALGnet in online auctions. We
demonstrate that it adapts to the distributional shift and recovers near optimal auctions faster than
RegretNet.
Setup. We implemented ALGnet in PyTorch. In Alg. 1, we used batches of valuation profiles
of size B ∈ {500} and set T ∈ {160000, 240000}, Tlimit ∈ {40000, 60000}, Tinit ∈ {800, 1600} and
τ ∈ {100}. We used the AdamW optimizer (Loshchilov and Hutter, 2017) to train the Auctioneer’s
and the Misreporter’s networks with learning rate γ ∈ {0.0005, 0.001}. Typical values for the archi-
tecture’s parameters are na = np = nm ∈ [3, 7] and hp = hn = hm ∈ {100, 200}.
For each experiment, we compute the total revenue rev := EV∼D[
∑
i∈N p
w
i (V
`)] and average
regret rgt := 1/nEV∼D[
∑
i∈N r
w
i (V
`)]. These averages are computed using a test set of 10, 000
valuation profiles. We run each experiment 5 times with different random seeds and report the
average of these runs and the standard variation in the form of (±σ) in our tables and shaded area
in our plots. Whenever we compare our results to RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019), we make sure
that both networks ALGnet and RegretNet have similar sizes and are trained in the same conditions.
6.1 Auctions with known and unknown optima
Known settings. We show that ALGnet is capable of recovering near optimal auction in different
well-studied auctions that have an analytical solution. These are one bidder and two items auctions
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where the valuations of the two items v1 and v2 are independent. We consider the following settings:
– (A): v1 and v2 are i.i.d. from U [0, 1]
– (B): v1 ∼ U [4, 16] and v2 ∼ U [4, 7]
– (C): v1 has density f1(x) = 5/(1 + x)6 and v2 has density f2(y) = 6/(1 + y)7.
(A) is the celebrated Manelli-Vincent auction (Manelli and Vincent, 2006); (B) is a non-i.i.d.
auction and (C) is a non-i.i.d. heavy-tail auction and both of them are studied in Daskalakis et al.
(2017). We compare our results to the theoretical optimal auction (Table 2). During the training
process, reg decays to 0 while rev and P ∗ converge to the optimal revenue. For (A), we also plot
rev , rgt and P ∗ as function of the number of epochs and we compare it to RegretNet (Fig. 2).
Contrary to ALGnet, we observe
that RegretNet overestimates the
revenue in the early stages of train-
ing at the expense of a higher regret.
As a consequence, ALGnet learns
the optimal auction faster than Re-
gretNet while being schedule-free
and requiring less hyperparameters.
Table 2: Revenue and regret for (A), (B) and (C).
Optimal ALGnet (Ours)
rev rgt rev rgt (×10−3 )
(A) 0.550 0 0.555 (±0.0019) 0.55 (±0.14)
(B) 9.781 0 9.737 (±0.0443) 0.75 (±0.17)
(C) 0.1706 0 0.1712 (±0.0012) 0.14 (±0.07)
(a) (b) (c)
(d) (e) (f)
Figure 2: (a), (b), (c) compares the evolution of the revenue, regret and P ∗ as a function of the
number of epoch for RegretNet and ALGnet. (d), (e), (f) compare the evolution of the revenue,
regret and P ∗ as a function of time ALGnet, (offline) RegretNet and an online version of RegretNet.
Unknown and large-scale auctions. We now consider settings where the optimal auction is
unknown. We look at n-bidder m-item additive settings where the valuations are sampled i.i.d from
U [0, 1] which we will denote by n×m. In addition to "reasonable"-scale auctions (1× 10 and 2× 2),
we investigate large-scale auctions (3 × 10 and 5 × 10) that are much more complex. Only deep
10
learning methods are able to solve them efficiently. Table 3 show that ALGnet is able to discover
auctions that yield comparable or better results than RegretNet. We believe that these results are
optimal and one cannot do much better than the original results for RegretNet in Duetting et al.
(2019). We would like to emphasise that the results for RegretNet are highly dependent on the
ability to a expensive hyperparameter search to find an adequate Lagrangian scheduling (§4). In
contrast, ALGnet is a scheduling-free algorithm that has much less hyperparameters.
Setting RegretNet ALGnet (Ours)
rev rgt rev rgt
1× 2 0.554 < 1.0 · 10−3 0.555 (±0.0019) 0.55 · 10−3(±0.14 · 10−3)
1× 10 3.461 < 3.0 · 10−3 3.487 (±0.0135) 1.65 · 10−3(±0.57 · 10−3)
2× 2 0.878 < 1.0 · 10−3 0.879 (±0.0024) 0.58 · 10−3(±0.23 · 10−3)
3× 10 5.541 < 2.0 · 10−3 5.562 (±0.0308) 1.93 · 10−3(±0.33 · 10−3)
5× 10 6.778 < 5.0 · 10−3 6.781 (±0.0504) 3.85 · 10−3(±0.43 · 10−3)
Table 3: Comparison of RegretNet and ALGnet for different n×m settings. The values reported for
RegretNet are found in Duetting et al. (2019), the numerical values for rgt and standard deviations
are not available.
6.2 Online auctions
ALGnet is an online algorithm with a time-independent loss function. We would expect it to perform
well in settings where the underlying distribution of the valuations changes over time. We consider a
one bidder and two items additive auction with valuations v1 and v2 sampled i.i.d from U [0, 1 + t]
where t in increased from 0 to 1 at a steady rate. The optimal auction at time t has revenue
0.55× (1 + t). We use ALGnet and two versions of RegretNet, the original offline version (App. A)
and an online version (App. B) and plot rev(t), rgt(t) and P ∗(t) (Fig. 2). The offline version learns
from a fixed dataset of valuations sampled at t = 0 (i.e. with V ∼ U [0, 1]nm) while the online version
(as ALGnet) learns from a stream of data at each time t. Overall, ALGnet performs better than the
other methods. It learns an optimal auction faster at the initial (especially compared to RegretNet
Online) and keep adapting to the distributional shift (contrary to vanilla RegretNet).
7 Conclusion
We identified two inefficiencies in previous approaches to deep auction design and propose solutions,
building upon recent trends and results from machine learning (amortization) and theoretical auction
design (stationary Lagrangian). This resulted in a novel formulation of auction learning as a two-
player game between an Auctioneer and a Misreporter and a new architecture ALGnet. ALGnet
requires significantly fewer hyperparameters than previous Lagrangian approaches. We demonstrated
the effectiveness of ALGnet on a variety of examples by comparing it to the theoretical optimal
auction when it is known, and to RegretNet when the optimal solution is not known.
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A Training Algorithm for Regret Net
We present the training algorithm for RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019).
Algorithm 2 Training Algorithm.
1: Input: Minibatches S1, . . . ,ST of size B
2: Parameters: γ > 0, η > 0, c > 0, R ∈ N, T ∈ N, Tρ ∈ N, Tλ ∈ N.
3: Initialize Parameters: ρ0 ∈ R, w0 ∈ Rd, λ0 ∈ Rn,
4: Initialize Misreports: v′i
(`) ∈ Di, ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N.
5:
6: for t = 0, . . . , T do
7: Receive minibatch St = {V (1), . . . , V (B)}.
8: for r = 0, . . . , R do
9: ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ n :
v′i
(`) ← v′i(`) + γ∇v′iuw
t
i (vi
(`); (v′i
(`)
, V
(`)
−i ))
10:
11: Get Lagrangian gradient and update wt:
12: wt+1 ← wt − η∇wL(wt;λt; ρt).
13:
14: Update ρ once in Tρ iterations:
15: if t is a multiple of Tρ then
16: ρt+1 ← ρt + c
17: else
18: ρt+1 ← ρt
19:
20: Update Lagrange multipliers once in Tλ iterations:
21: if t is a multiple of Tλ then
22: λt+1i ← λti + ρt r̂i(wt), ∀i ∈ N
23: else
24: λt+1 ← λt
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B Online training algorithm for Regret Net
We present an online version of the training algorithm for RegretNet (Duetting et al., 2019).
Algorithm 3 Training Algorithm.
1: Input: Valuation’s Distribution D
2: Parameters: γ > 0, η > 0, c > 0, R ∈ N, T ∈ N, Tρ ∈ N, Tλ ∈ N, B ∈ N
3: Initialize Parameters: ρ0 ∈ R, w0 ∈ Rd, λ0 ∈ Rn,
4: for t = 0, . . . , T do
5: Sample minibatch St = {V (1), . . . , V (B)} from distribution D.
6: Initialize Misreports: v′i
(`) ∈ Di, ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ N.
7:
8: for r = 0, . . . , R do
9: ∀` ∈ [B], i ∈ n :
v′i
(`) ← v′i(`) + γ∇v′iuw
t
i (vi
(`); (v′i
(`)
, V
(`)
−i ))
10:
11: Get Lagrangian gradient and update wt:
12: wt+1 ← wt − η∇wL(wt;λt; ρt).
13:
14: Update ρ once in Tρ iterations:
15: if t is a multiple of Tρ then
16: ρt+1 ← ρt + c
17: else
18: ρt+1 ← ρt
19:
20: Update Lagrange multipliers once in Tλ iterations:
21: if t is a multiple of Tλ then
22: λt+1i ← λti + ρt r̂i(wt),∀i ∈ N
23: else
24: λt+1 ← λt
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C Proof of Prop. 1
Lemma 1. Let M be a one bidder m item mechanism with expected revenue P and expected regret
R, then ∀ε > 0, there exists a mechanism M ′ with expected revenue P ′ = (1− ε)P − 1−εε R and zero
expected regret, R′ = 0.
Proof. For every valuation vector v ∈ D, let g(v) and p(v) denote the allocation vector and price
that M assigns to v.
We now consider the mechanism M ′ that does the following:
• g′(v) = g(v′)
• p′(v) = (1− ε) p(v′)
Where v′ is given by : v′ = argmaxv˜∈D 〈v , g(v˜)〉 − (1− ε) p(v˜). By construction, the mechanism M ′
has zero regret, all we have to do now is bound its revenue. If we denote by R(v) the regret of the
profile v in the mechanism M , R(v) = maxv˜∈D 〈v , g(v˜)− g(v)〉 − (p(v˜)− p(v)) we have.
〈v , g(v′)〉 − p(v′) = 〈v , g(v)〉 − p(v) + 〈v , g(v′)− g(v)〉 − (p(v′)− p(v))
6 〈v , g(v)〉 − p(v) +R(v)
Which we will write as:
〈v , g(v)〉 − p(v) > 〈v , g(v′)〉 − p(v′)−R(v)
Second, we have by construction:
〈v , g(v′)〉 − (1− ε)p(v′) > 〈v , g(v)〉 − (1− ε)p(v)
By summing these two relations we find :
p(v′) > p(v)− R(v)
ε
Finally we get that:
p′(v) > (1− ε) p(v)− 1− ε
ε
R(v)
Taking the expectation we get:
P ′ > (1− ε)P − 1− ε
ε
R
Lemma 2 (Generalization of Lemma 1). Let M be a n-bidder m-item additive auction. Let Pi and
Ri be the expected revenue and regret related to bidder i:
Pi = EV ∈D [〈gi(V ) , Vi〉 − pi(V )]
Ri = EV ∈D
[
max v′i∈Di
(〈gi(v′i, V−i) , Vi〉 − pi(v′i, V−i))− (〈gi(V ) , Vi〉 − pi(V ))]
Let P be the average total revenue of M , P =
∑n
i=1 Pi and R the total average regret, R =
∑n
i=1Ri.
Then, ∀ε > 0, there exists a mechanism M ′ with expected revenue P ′ = (1 − ε) (P − Rε ) and zero
expected regret, R′ = 0.
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Proof. While the proof of Lemma 1 is quite digestible, the multi-bidder extension to Lemma 2 is
much more involved. To see why, let’s just provide intuition for why the same approach in Lemma 1
does not work. If we were to just discount the prices offered to bidder one, and then let them pick
whatever option they now like best, we could certainly make guarantees on the payments made
by bidder one. In particular, these guarantees would be exactly as in Lemma 1. The huge catch,
however, is that as bidder one radically changes the options they choose to purchase, this will also
radically change what options are available to other bidders, and we have absolutely no guarantees
on how bidder one’s change in behavior affects other bidders.
To address this, Hartline et al. (2015); Bei and Huang (2011); Dughmi et al. (2017) develop a
sophisticated reduction for turning algorithms into truthful mechanisms, which was later extended
in Daskalakis and Weinberg (2012); Rubinstein and Weinberg (2018); Cai et al. (2019) to reduce
ε-truthful mechanisms into truthful mechanisms with small loss in revenue. For example, Lemma 2
follows immediately from Theorem 5.2 in Rubinstein and Weinberg (2018).2
Proposition 1. Let M be an additive auction with n bidders and m items. Let P and R denote
the total expected revenue and regret, P = EV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 pi(V )] and R = EV ∈D [
∑n
i=1 ri(V )]. There
exists a mechanismM∗ with expected revenue P ∗ =
(√
P −√R
)2
and zero regret R∗ = 0.
Proof. From Lemma 2 we know that ∀ε > 0, we can find a zero regret mechanism with revenue
P ′ = (1− ε)P − 1−εε R. By optimizing over ε we find that the best mechanism is the one correspond
to ε =
√
R
P . The resulting optimal revenue is given by:
P ∗ = (1−
√
R
P
)P −
√
R
P√
R
P
R = P − 2
√
PR+R =
(√
P −
√
R
)2
2To be extra clear, Lemma 2 is a special case of their Theorem 5.2 where Val(δ) = 0, and their η is equal to our
R/n.
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